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Article 6

Book Reviews
lVbat Coleridge Thought by Owen Barfield. Middletown: Wesleyan University
Press, 1971. Pp. xii + 285. $15.00.
In the first edition of Romanticism Comes of Age (1944), Owen Barfield
collected some of the essays and lectures he had written, mostly for an audience
composed of his fellow students of Rudolf Steiner in the Anthroposophical
Movement. They had been written over a period of a good many years, years
in which Barfield's time for reading, serious thought and writing had to be fitted
to the exacting demands of his profession (from 1931 to 1959 he was a practicing
solicitor in London). In the Preface to that book Barfield wrote of some of his
misgivings: ", .. I see that the area of subject-matter over which they [the
essays] directly or allusively range must appear wide, its communications tortuous
and its boundaries ill-defined. I seem to have chosen a continent instead of a
country, for a rather haphazard walking-tour."
vVitb feelings at least somewhat analogous to those of Barfield on that occasion, I am undertaking to speak of Barfield's book, What Coleddge Tbought.
The source of these feelings? Though it is but one book of which I am
attempting to write, that book is concerned with an extraordinarily rich and
extensive subject, and it demands more authentic intellectual energy from its
reader than most books one is likely to encounter.
I will begin by referring again to Romanticism Comes of Age: to the Preface
to the revised and enlarged edition of 1966. At the close of that Preface, Barfield
referred, rather diffidently, to an essay he had written in 1932 and which he had
decided to include in the collection:
Altogether the scholarly work that has been done in tIus field and the
fullness of thought that has been given to it in many quarters make me
rather ashamed of the inchoate and skeletal lecture on The Philosophy
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge which I delivered in 1932. I have left it in
its place here partly because, though there are plentiful allusions to him
elsewhere in the book, a collection of this nature without one essay on
STC ,vould be too much like Hamlet without the Prince; partly also as a
kind of 'trailer' for the amends I hope to make before long in the
shape of a full-length book on Coleridge, wherein the whole issue of
the 'dynamic' philosophy will be taken up on lines not hitherto, as far
as r know, attempted.

rVhat Coleridge Thought is that book. I feel about as capable of "reviewing"
it as r feel capable of giving a brief digest of the Bbagavad-Gita or a short view
of the Grand Canyon. Weak analogies both, but if they give some feeling of
immensity, they \vill serve. Wbat Co!e1'idge Thought is immense, though it is
by no means physically large.
r am seldom "awed" by books. I have more than my share of that general
irony with which we protect ourselves from awkward reverence. But I am
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nearly "awed" by this book-the result of 40 years of Barfield's experience
concentrated on the still, somehow, inexhaustible fertility and suggestiveness of
the mind of S. T. Coleridge. Perhaps lowe it to the reader to say that since
I began reading Barfield some eight or ten years ago, his work has become one
of the most important elements in my mental life. So I could be thought guilty
of reading the general significance that Barfield has had for me into my experience
of this book. But I don't think this is the case,l- If I am right, TV1:Jat Coleridge
Tbougbt is not only the most important book to appear on Coleridge for a long
time, it is one of the more important books on any subject one is likely to
discover. One thing is certain, beyond any quibbles of opinion or personal prejudice: it is a unique book. Nothing remotely like it on Coleridge has ever been
done.
In what qualities does this uniqueness inhere? Many could be mentioned.
There is the range of Barfield's references and knowledge, cutting across the
fields of orthodox philosophy and psychology, scientific theory, exoteric and
esoteric theology, philological and semantic theory, literary history, and a good
many others; his intimate acquaintance with the large and often unwicldly canon
of Coleridge's writing; his great knowledge of the traditions from which Coleridge
himself drew; perhaps above all the subtlety of Barfield's intellect, the depth of
philosophical acuity, and the firmness of argument which plays through and
around every paragraph. I shall speak further of some of these qualities, but
for now it may be said that the peculiar quality which distinguishes TVhat
Coleridge Thought from the many other books-often very good books-which
have been written on Coleridge is this: Barfield's work is organic with Coleridge's
own work in a way that not even the most successful of other books on Coleridge
have been. Barfield's thought occupies precisely the same spectrum as Coleridge's
own (though of course he also knows the textures of western culture since
Coleridge's time, and that is one of the important things about this book).
Another way of putting this might be to say, quoting Howard Nemerov's
comment on the dust jacket, that" it is not too much to say that in Barfield,
I
Coleridge has met a mind, penetrating, coherent, lucid, that he could have
, aclmowledged as the equal and complement of his own." This sounds like a
piece of conventional puffery, but it is not. Or take the book's very title.
Cannot one detect a certain implicit arrogance? By what right does this man
presume to expound" what Coleridge thought"? Would it not have been more
seemly to call the book The Shape of Co!e1·idge's A1ind, or Coleridge and the
Idealist Tradition, or even An Introduction to Coleridge's Thought? To the
former question I would respond, by something akin to the right of connaturalitythus going even further along that line than Mr. Nemerov. To the latter: such
more orthodox and academic titles would give no sense of the way in which
Barfield presumes to talk, nor of the commitment he has to his subject. Perhaps
there is a certain "arrogance" in presuming that one has penetrated so far into
as complex a mind as Coleridge'S as to be able to speak without the usual
1 Though I ought to point out that, ""hile this book can certainly stand on
its own, it gains immeasurably in richness if the reader has some Immvledge of
Barfield's earlier work: not only Romanticism Comes of Age, but Poetic Diction,
Saving tbe Appearances, and all his earlier books are relevant.
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devices of "perhaps" and "it seems to me" and "it appears to have been the
case "; but if any book ever vindicated its claim to authority, this is it.
Barfield asks in his Introduction whether there are any qualities which the
many excellent studies of Coleridge share, and he responds: "Yes, there are
two-the predominance firstly of what I would call the biographical/comparative
approach and secondly of the biographical/psychological approach; and I should
hope that the terms I was using were re,asonably self-explanatory." A little later,
speaking of the limitation of the biographical/comparative approach (in language
that might apply, in a slightly different manner, to the psychological approach
as well), Batfield comments that:
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Its learned debates have something in common with the water of Lethe.
To become immersed in them is to risk forgetting that one at least of
the interesting questions about almost any thought is the question whether
it is sound or unsound, valid or invalid, true or untrue. If I find it depressing when a distinguished literary critic complains that I Coleridge has
little insight into the incompatability of different trends of thought,' it
is because this seems to me to betray a deplorable inability to distinguish
between philosophy and talking about philosophy. Philosophy is, to my
mind, not much concerned with I trends' of thought. It is concerned
with thought. Is it seriously suggested that Coleridge was incapable of
detecting the incompatability of one thought with another? Or with
proven fact? If so, let us first be shown the point or points at which
this occurred. Time enough then to start investigating the confused
borrowings, or the unconscious motivation, that seduced him to it. (7-8)
What questions are here raised! They are so obvious, and so difficult. We
are asked to consider not where the thoughts originated, but whether they are
true; not how Coleridge's poor damaged mind managed to fit them together,
but whether there are any compelling reasons to pay attention to them. No
one has, I think, ever begun to talk of Coleridge in this way (with the possible
exception of J. H. Green, who was his" disciple" in a way that Barfield certainly is not); very few writers on Coleridge-or, indeed, any other subject, ever
arrive at it. The paralyzing simplicity of questions like: is it true? how does it
force us to change our mode of thought? raise a whole series of issues which it
is far easier to sidestep or never to raise; it is easier to maintain aloofness, a
cultivated and dispassionate suspension of judgment.
Given this approach, Barfield evades some of the dearest " Coleridge problems"
in ways that might infuriate more orthodox scholars; he may even lead some
to think that he is also sidestepping issues. But there is a pervasive and laconic
wit in the exposition which demonstrates that had Barfield cared to address
these issues more fully he could have; but he chose not to: there are more
important questions. On the vexed issue of Coleridge's "plagiarism": " Verbal
plagiarism, as a labour-saving breach of the law of copyright, is a matter of
demonstrable fact, and there is not much doubt that, as the law now stands,
Schelling could have sued Coleridge in respect of one or two pages in the Biogr?pbia Literaria." (6) (This is the lawyer speaking, and one who knows somethmg of such issues.) This is not the only place where Barfield touches on the
plagiarism issue: he lets us know, briefly, that he is not remotely convinced

issu
~u

wh
rna
the
Ian
de!
the
rna
Th
all!

for
we

rnl

his
,hi

co
th

, nc
I

.'

BOOK REvIEWS

177

by any "case" against Coleridge, and turns aside to the larger questions.:! Or
take the almost equally celebrated issue of Coleridge's obscurity: his maddening
circumlocutions and labyrinthine parentheses, the digressive footnotes, the exotic
vocabulary (frequently of his own coinage). At onc particularly tricky point
in his exposition of Coleridge on Imagination and Fancy, Barfield pauses to
remark: "the object of this book is, not to contend that Coleridge invariably
expressed himself in the way least calculated to confuse his readers, but to
disclose, if possible, what he in fact thought." (83)
Or another issue: more important than those raised in the paragraph above.
That issue is the one clustered around the words "organic" and "organicism"
and the phrase "organic metaphor." Nmv Barfield by no means evades this
issue (nor does he "evade" the others in any conventional sense); he faces it
squarely and at length. But he does so in a way that may cause those of us
who arc accustomed to thinking of Coleridge along some such lines as the "first
major exponent of organic philosophy in English," or as the one who introduced
the "organic metaphor" as a means of talking not only about a kind of literary
language but of the nature of the human mind, to feel as if ,ve had been suddenly stood on our heads. Precisely what is meant by an "organic" "ie\v of
the human mind or poetry? That the mind-or poem-grows and develops in a
manner analogous to organic life forms, as contrasted '\vith "inorganic" matter?
That, says Barfield, is totally misleading: the usual separation between" organic"
and" inorganic" will not do to describe Coleridge. If we say, with fvi. H. Abrams,
for example, that we find in Coleridge "organic metaphors of the mind," then
we have completely missed the point:
'Metaphor of mind' signifies an extra-mental process described because
it is separate from, but analogous to, a mental one, which latter it may
therefore lead us to apprehend. Now not only is this not ~hat Coleridge
himself thought he was giving us in his psychology and his critical
theory; it is what he spent a substantial part of his time and energy
explaining that he VlaS not giving us. (59)
If Coleridge was not giving us a "metaphor of mind "; if the phrases" organic
metaphor" and "organic theory of poetry" are usually misleading; if in fact
his "organicism" is something quite different from what most orthodox scholarship has taken it to be (and Barfield affirms all these things)3 how shall we begin
2 Thomas 1VlcFarland's Cole1'idge and the Pantbeist Tradition (Oxford, 1969)
contains the fullest, and probably the best, discussion of the plagiarism issue
that I have read.
l! One
must not conclude that he scorns "orthodox scholarship." Far from
it, though he does think Coleridge scholars have seldom penetrated the real
dynamics of his thought. He has a great respect for much scholarship, and
frequently acknowledges debts to it. For example, he admires the worle, among
others, of J. A. Appleyard and 1VI. H. Abrams, and his book is dedicated to
Kathleen Coburn. In one note to Abrams' The A1irror CInd tbe Lamp, while
disagreeing with crucial points, Barfield nevertheless says that the book "is a
sort of paradigm for me of ."hat such a book should be, and one which I have
no hope of nearing myself. But that only adds to the importance of what I am
saying. The point is, not that Professor Abrams falls short in this respect, but
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to understand it? And with this question we have really come to the heart of
the matter. There is no easy way to answer the question, though we can begin
by making a point which seems central. For Barfield, Coleridge's fundamental
premises concerning the nature of life, the relationship between the human mind
and the larger world, were so radically different from those of his contemporaries
(including many-like Immanuel Kant, for example-with whom one would have
tbought to find him in agreement), that there was little common ground for a
meeting between his views and more orthodox ones. And if this was true of
Coleridge's relationship to his contemporaries, it is generally even more true of
the relationship between Coleridge and the major traditions of thought since
his time.
If this is indeed the case, and I think that it is, where shall we make our entry
into Coleridge's mind, and what must we try to understand before we are in
a position to decide whether or not to take him seriously? Do his views on man
and nature, literature and science, and many other topics have anything of value
in them? Is there indeed an alternative view of reality in Coleridge, a mode
of thought important enough to take seriously? Now, Barfield answers these
questions, but it would be foolish to try to reproduce his argument, which is
coherent, consecutive, and at all points demanding. I can touch a few of his
points only, and anyone who decides the subject is worth taking seriously will
have to read Barfield for himself (as well as more of Coleridge than the customary few chapters from Biogmphia Literaria).
At this point I must say that anyone who wishes to study Coleridge from a
purely" literary" standpoint is going to find Barfield's book hard going; though
if he persists he will discover that Barfield casts more light on "literary" questions than narrower approaches have done. It is not until his sixth chapter, for
example, that the" familiar" territory of Imagination and Fancy appears directly
in Barfield's exposition. Instead, he begins with what was, for Coleridge, the
central fact, issue, theme: the question of consciousness. But it is not consciousness considered as a philosophical subject in the usual sense: it is the act of
consciousness, the actual experience of thinking, that preoccupied Coleridge. It
was in the action and energy of thinking itself, rather than in thought, or consciousness considered as mere object, that Coleridge grounds all he has to say
on other issues. Indeed, although the point is subtle and requires more discussion
than I can give it, it is crucial that this distinction between thought as an object
and the activity of thinking be discerned. Nearly all of Coleridge'S leading
principles will be discovered to be involved with what was to him a central truth:
that the will is involved in all our thinking, even though we may be unconscious
of that involvement (If this sounds to us like a contradiction, as it did to
Coleridge'S contemporaries, we must remember that not only was he one of the
great shapers of our modern preoccupation with "consciousness," he was in
that even Professor Abrams does." (210, n. 3) Incidentally, it is altogether fitting
that in a book on Coleridge, that voluminous note-writer, Barfield should have
put much of his best material into his notes, often lengthy and important discussions. There are 73 pages of notes to 193 of text. While many of these are
bibliographical citations, many others contain important, and occasionally crucial,
materials.
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some ways practically the discoverer of the unconscious.) Barfield emphasizes
how essential for an understanding of Coleridge these matters are:
Coleridge will continue to be called 'cloudy' even by his admirers,
because he will continue to be misinterpreted by readers who are not
willing to grasp, and to remember once they have grasped, the elementary
principles which consciously permeate almost every other sentence he
constructs. . .. These are: first, that thinking is an act. Secondly, that
it is normally, though not necessarily and always, an unconscious act.
Thirdly, that though we are not normally conscious of the act, we are
normally conscious of the product of the act (which we call' thoughts '),
and indeed it is this, which actually constitutes our self-consciousness as
human beings. (21)
From this discussion of the question of consciousness; which \ve might call
the psychological and epistemological foundations, Barfield moves on to those
ontological and metaphysical questions that underlie the problems of consciousness. That is to say, he moves on to Coleridge's view of nature, and life itself.
Do those seem large questions, overly philosophical for those who merely "'.vish
to deal with STC the literary critic? Well, they m'e large, but they are also
vital; and it is part of the burden of Barfield's book that Coleridge offers a
comprehensive view of human experience, and there is no way to understand
adequately his views on literature without seeing the larger continuum.
He opens his discussion of Coleridge'S views on the constitution of nature
prefacing his second chapter with a quotation from David Bohm's Ccrusality
Chance in Modern Pbysics. Bohm is an extraordinarily interesting physicist, and
the reference to him here is a reminder of how deeply Barfield himself has been
interested in the philosophy of science, and how unified and how wide a spectrum
his views cover. (One of the later chapters is caned" Coleridge and the Cosmology of Science," and while it is foolish to select certain portions of the book
as being "more significant" than others, this chapter is full of the most farreaching implications.) Barfield's point in introducing Bohm and modern physics
is to anticipate a point he will develop later: there are some interesting relationships benveen the dynamics of Coleridge'S thought and some recent developments
in physics. But it is no part of Barfield's purpose to praise Coleridge by drawing
atention to some interesting parallels or happy congruences. On the contrary,
he is quick to point out that Coleridge
... takes a further step which differentiates his concept of nature sharply
from that of most, if not ali, modern physicists. To investigate scientifically the nature of Nature is to investigate the nature of phenomena as
such. It is to ask the question: What is a phenomenon? (23)
And to this question, the Coleridgean reply is, in part: "the solution of phenomena can never be derived from phenomena."
Where then must one look for a "solution of phenomena "? The brief answer
is: not in natura naturata-or phenomenal nature-bur in natUTa naturans-which
might be called "productive nature," though any single phrase of this type is
bound to be misleading. Barfield's analysis of the relation between natzwata and
naturans leads us to the point of recognizing that Coleridge was challengina the
entire Cartesian orthodoxy of modern philosophy and science, and that h: was
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attempting to penetrate what he called the "lost dynamics" of the relation
between mind and world that had been ruled out of order-" occult," in the
precise sense of that word-by the rigid separation of subject from object characteristic of modern western philosophical traditions. Modern science, of course,
does not recognize any phenomena that correspond to Coleridge's natura 1Zaturans,
To which Barfield's (and Coleridge's) answer is simple: of course it does not.
How could anyone recognize as phenomenal that which by nature is not phenomenal? Coleridge's naturans is not phenomenal and to dismiss it because it is
"not phenomenal" is to beg the question; for it is the very power, the energy,
the force, which makes phenomena possible.
And how does" it" do this? Here we are very close to the heart of Coleridge'S
thought, and Barfield's book. The "answer" is that, at the heart of natura
naturans lies the law of polarity: that power which, while one in itself, nevertheless gives rise to a successive duality, which duality in turn strives toward
reunion (and if one says, that is only the Hegelian dialectic, one has again misunderstood). These few phrases can give no idea of the importance of rilis
conception, but it must be stressed that the law of polarity is in a sense the
pons asinoru1n; it must be contemplated deeply if either Barfield or Coleridge
are going to make sense. The trouble is, this is the language of exposition,
abstract logic, and book reviews. One cannot "make sense" of the concept
of polarity; although through contemplation one might arrive at its import, for
it is something that can be apprehended only by the imagination. But one must
interject that it is not necessarily that to which we (often loosely) refer as the
"poetic imagination" that alone can grasp the reality of polar relationship:
it is imagination in any of its roles-philosophic, literary, scientific. It is one of
the virtues of Barfield's book that he extends the significance of "imagination"
far beyond the notions usually held by literature scholars, though not beyond
Coleridge'S own conceptions (except insofar as Barfield is a twentieth-century
man, and Coleridge lived in the nineteenth century).
Polar. Polarity. It is a word we use all the time. Poles. At opposite poles.
Polarised. We understand it well enough, for it is part of all our vocabularies.
But do we? Whatever it is we may understand by "polarity," I think it safe
to say that there can be very few readers-perhaps none at all-who will understand anything like the range of implications which polarity carries for Barfield
(I might add that rills is especially true in this book on Coleridge, but the
observation also applies to the whole of Barfield's work). And here I must do
a little quoting from Barfield:
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Polarity is dynamic, not abstract. It is not 'a mere balance or compromise; but 'a living and generative interpretation.' Where logical
opposites are contradictory . . . polar opposites exist by virtue of each
other as well as at the expense of each other; 'each is that which it is
called, relatively, by predominance of the one character or quality, not
by the absolute exclusion of the other.' Moreover each quality or character is present in the other. We can and must distinguish, but there is no
possibility of dividing them.
But when one has said all tllls, how much has one succeeded in conveying? How much use are definitions of the undefinable? The point
is, has the imagination grasped it? For nothing else can do so. (36)
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The relation of polarity, then, exists at the very heart of natura naturans. It is
that "productive unity," that "separative projection" by which the familiar
forms of phenomenal nature are continually produced. But "polarity" runs
through every phase of Coleridge, and ultimately it is the "secret" which
underlies man's relation to the rest of nature, to his society, to God. For it is
his conviction of the reality of man's polar relationship to nature that leads
Coleridge to affirm, in context after context, that the productive power of nature
and the principle of human intelligence are essentially of one kind. As Barfield
puts it:
The productive power, then, which in nature acts as nature, is nevertheless 'essentially one (that is, of one kind) with the intelligence, which
is in the human mind above nature.' This is where Coleridge's concept
of nature, and of evolution, differs so sharply from the one we are accustomed to that its usual fate with his commentators is to be ignored. For,
after all, how can it be so? How can the life-force operative out there
in nature-how can any 'force '-be of one kind with the intelligence in
the human mind? (61)
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Barfield is right in his comment, and in his questions. This is the crux. This
is so radically different from all we have ever been taught to believe that there
are very few people who do not find it "outlandish." Perhaps the philosophically
sophisticated will speak of "standard idealistic arguments" (though they would
be wrong). Very few modern readers can find themselves capable of taking it
seriously, except in an archaeological sense-one more curiosity dug up from
the past: interesting for what it tells us of an era, a man. But not to be taken
as a viable mode of thought.
And dus is a very great mistake. Coleridge's thought, and Barfield's subject
matter, is not merely something to flesh out our picture of the Romantic movement and the early nineteenth century. Read seriously and contemplated carefully, Barfield's book is capable of transforming the way we think of literary
criticism, of science, of theology-any area, literally, one could name. But as
Barfield says (speaking here of science), "We cannot begin to determine Coleridge's relation to science without first proceeding to the somewhat unacademic
extreme of making up our minds whether or not we must agree with something
he said." (142) To which it must be added: And we must first find out what
he said.
This book is the real thing, one of those books that appears only very rarely
that is capable of genuinely altering the way one thinks. If anything I have
written above seems in the least adulatory, I can only insist that it is not at all
so, in view of the subject. Nor should anything I have said be taken to imply
that Barfield's book is in turn adulatory of Coleridge-that it blinks his weaknesses,
his confusing terminology, his fragmentation; that Barfield is not very much his
own man, capable of recognizing Coleridge'S shortcomings. Should this be the
case, I will have failed to make clear the essential nature of the book, and failed
to portray adequately its fundamentally radical character. "Radicalism" may
seem a strange quality to impute to Coleridge, but it is a valid one; and it is
even more valid to impute it to Barfield himself.
Where does Barfield locate the significance of Coleridge (and, by inference,
of his own book)?
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like
It will become apparent to anyone who has the patience to reach the
end of dus book that I find the relevance of Coleridge's thought to our
time where he himself located its relevance to his own. It resides, above
all else, in his radical critique of one or two major presuppositions, upon
which the immediate thinking, and as a result the whole cultural and
social structure of this 'epoch of the understanding and the senses'
(including supposedly radical revolts against it) is so firmly-or is it now
infirmly? -established. As long as this is ignored, I doubt if he has much
to say to us, whether as a philosopher or as a sociologist. (11-12, italics
mine)
You can't get much more radical than that, for it digs down into the roots of
thought itself.
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I want to close with a publication note. Wesleyan University Press has now
published five of Barfield's books in their American editions: in addition to
TVhat Coleridge Thought, these are: Romanticism Comes of Age, Unancestral
Voice, Worlds Apart, and Speake1"s Meaning. They are in the process of
bringing out a new edition of Ius early, invaluable, and out of print Poetic
Diction. There is at least one person, and I presume there are others, who feel
a debt of gratitude tovlard Wesleyan for making available the work of a writer
like Barfield. I would feel myself even more grateful if some way could be
found to make What Coleridge Thought available in a cheaper edition .. I realize
the difficult economies of book publishing, but this book ought to be more widely
available, in spite of its ostensibly difficult subject matter. One wants to recommend it to friends, to students. I have done so, but $15.00 is just too much for
many of them to pay (It has been made a Scholar's Library selection by MLA;
which helps, but it still isn't enough.) It ought to be available: it is not a book
to be confined to the shelves of university libraries and a few Coleridge
specialists.

R. K.
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Michigan State University

The Introduction of Western Literary Theories into Modern China: 1919-1925
by Bonnie S. McDougall. Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural
Studies, 1971. Pp. xii + 368. No price.
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This is a detailed, well-documented work, especially useful in the sense of an
annotated bibliography. Dr. McDougall has surely fulfilled her object which
"was simply to identify, analyse and compare those Western concepts which
were undoubtedly present in the thinking of the [Chinese] writers themselves."
(p. 264) She is at her best when with patience and care she relates the salient
points of a lengthy article. She commands impressive, wide-range information
for her (sometimes unwieldy) source materials.
Even more remarkable is the author's unprejudiced attitude. The six years
covered in this study were a period during which the inchoate Chinese writers,
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like most of their compatriots in the other fields, craved for new-or rather,
Western-models. The character hsin (new) was ubiquitous; besides "New Culture" and "New Literature," the two most sacred intellectual movements at
the time, scores of journals and newspapers sported hsin in their titles. From
the hindsight of nearly a half century, it would be easy and convenient for
McDougall to follow the trend of some scholars to mock or patronize those
Chinese neophytes frantically trying to import" advanced" foreign literary ideas.
McDougall's fair-mindedness and power of understanding are evidenced when
she ends the book with her "personal admiration for the great energy and independence of spirit of the youthful pioneers of the Literary Revolution." (p. 268)
Rather than portraying an over-all picture, the approach throughout the book
is to concentrate on some of the contemporary Western literary theories that
happened to find their way into China. Thus, apart from such familiar names
as Oscar Wilde, Georg Brandes and Kuriyagawa Hakuson, we learn that the
influence of Prof. C. T. Winchester who "was not an historian but more of a
connoisseur of literature, ... spread in many directions." (p. 57) On the Chinese
side the author likewise emphasizes the works of the most energetic transmitters,
with only desultory references to the contributions of the others. For example,
Lu Hsiin, translator and editor of Russian criticisms, appears mainly in connection with his 1907 essay" Discourse on Demonic Poetic Power." The Marxist
literary thoughts, already being introduced into China before 1925, are hardly
mentioned.
In the "preface" McDougall states that her concern is "the first decade of
the New Literary Movement (1917-37)." (p. v) Actually, as indicated in the
subtitle, only the years from 1919 to 1925 are included, and there is no explanation, either for the discrepancy or for the particular dates. This seems to me
an unfortunate oversight. It is true that 1919 is familiar to most people as the
year of the May Fourth lViovement (Another notable event is the inception
of the magazine Hsin Ch'ao or The Renaissance, one of McDougall's primary
sources.). But I rather doubt many people today can recognize any significance
in 1925. It turns out to be the time when the so-called May Thirtieth Incident
took place and shocked the Chinese people into painful awareness of the national crisis under Japanese persecution. It is largely for this reason that Shen
Yen-ping has marked these six years as the first stage in the history of the New
Literature.
After 1925 the leftist literary movement began to pick up momentum, culminating in the founding of the League of Left-wing Writers in 1930. It is
interesting to note that among the seven or eight "introducers" considered
most important by McDougall, Shen Yen-ping and T'ien Han became active
Communists and played leading roles in the Leftist League, and Kuo l\10-jo and
Cheng Chen-to also soon turned to the left. (This point is touched upon by
McDougall; see p. 216.) The literary theories they had transplanted with such
zest were gradually forgotten and discarded, and by 1934 Shen, perhaps the
most prominent figure in this book, saw fit to write in his Hua hsia-tzu (Chatterbox, a collection of literary essays that McDougall appears to have not consulted.) that" the literary theories of the May Fourth era already failed to take
root in the minds of the young people in the May Thirtieth period. Now they
are being even more scorned." While Sherr might have been a little sweeping
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in his dismissal of the historical, path-paving contributions of the years between
the two incidents, I cannot help wishing that Dr. McDougall had chosen to
investigate a longer period in a more comprehensive manner (even at the cost
of the summaries of foreign sources, which sometimes run into excessive length
anyway; e.g. pp. 108-18, 149-58), In any case, I would like to conclude by
hoping that she would go on to write about the post-I92S period (say 1926-30
or 1926-36). ,Vith her erudite background and her meticulous scholarship, the
result would surely further benefit all students of modern Chinese Literature.

H. C.

CHUANG

University of Soutbern California
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Anne Bradstreet: "The Tentb ll1use 11 by Elizabeth Wade \Vhite. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1971, Pp, xiv + 4JO, Illus, $12-50,

the

A literary biography of Anne Bradstreet has long been needed. As the first
published poet of colonial America, and as the first \voman poet of any significance to write in English, Anne Bradstreet has fascinated critics since the publication of her first book, The Tentl; lUuse, in 1662. The only study of any
length before Miss White's book was Josephine Piercy's Anne Bradstreet (Twayne,
1965), a monograph surveying the poet's spiritual and artistic development. But
since Miss Piercy's book was essentially a critical study of the poetry, it left a
thorough biographical study of Anne Bradstreet still to be done.
Both as biography and as literary criticism Elizabeth Wade \Vhite's study
makes some significant contributions to the study of Anne Bradstreet and of
Puritan poetry and aesthetics. A more thoroughly documented examination of
Anne Bradstreet, her times, and her poetry would be almost impossible to write.
Unfortunately, however, the very thoroughness of the book weakens its effectiveness as biography. Nliss White is so concerned \vith documenting every conceivable event, person, or place that has even the remotest connection with the
colonial poet that we lose a sense of Anne Bradstreet as a living woman behind
the accumulation of data. In short, there seems to be a confusion of purpose
in Miss White's book, for she deals with peripheral genealogical and historical
issues which are interesting and significant in themselves bur which destroy the
unity of the biography as biography.
Any biography of Anne Bradstreet must necessarily rest on a good deal of
conjecture and speculation based on what we know about women of her historical era, social class, educational background, and religious loyalties; for the
primary biographical materials are severely limited. Aside from Anne's own
writing (including her poems, prose meditations, and brief spiritual autobiography)
and some genealogical records, there is little else to go on. There are almost no
contemporary memoirs, letters, or other data which record how people felt
about her! what kind of personality she projected, or how she fared in her
pioneer environment. It is no doubt this sparseness of pertinent data that led
Miss White to fill out her biography with so much peripheral genealogical and
historical information. Miss White admits in her Preface that it is highly unusual
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to devote so much time in a biography to questions of ancestry. But she defends
that concentration because of "the light that it may shed on the psychological
attitudes of a founder and governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony and of his
daughter who was the founder of American literature." The- trouble is that
subsequent analysis does not justify that explanation. Miss White does some
detective work that is relevant to a genealogical study of the Thomas Dudleysj
but aside from establishing on firmer ground than other biographers have done
thatAnne is indeed a descendant of Sir Philip Sidney, the whole discussion bears
little relevance to a study of Anne Bradstreet.
There aTC other similarly peripheral or irrelevant matters: a description of the
boyhood and education of Anne's father, Thomas Dudley; a long discussion
of the political and religious affairs of Dudley and his contemporaries, particularly those relating to the emigration to Massachusetts Bay; and a good deal
of specific information concerning various early political and religious leaders of
Massachusetts Bay. All of these things are indirecdy related to Anne's life in
the New World. and so to her poetry; but none of them deserves the extended
treatment Miss White gives them.
Although Miss White focusses more clearly on Anne and her poetry in the
later chapters than in the earlier, we are often left with the feeling that Anne
is serving as an illustration of historical events, rather than the historical events
serving to illuminate Anne and her poetic development. For example, in Chapter
Eight, which discusses the publication of Tbe Tenth Muse, there is a twentypage digression on published women writers before Anne. The total length of
the chapter is 42 pages, so that the digression, together with a great deal of
specific bibliographic data on the publication of the book, and a discussion of
the identity of the authors of some prefatory tributes to Anne, constitute the
bulk of the chapter. Only a few pages are given to a conjectured discussion of
how Anne herself, as a person, fared in this most momentous event of her life.
If digression and peripheral matters of bibliography, genealogy, and history
tend to obscure the living image of Anne Bradstreet, Miss White's book nevertheless offers a wealth of information about Anne and her poetry. Her analyses
of individual poems are thorough and perceptive. One of the most valuable
aspects of NEss White's study is the critical perspective from which she discusses
those poems. She focuses on the tension in Anne's poetry between her vocation
as a poet and her status as a woman in Puritan New England, without falling
into the trap of so many critics of colonial literature-namely the mistaken notion
that the Puritans were opposed to poetry on theological grounds. On the contrary, Miss "\¥hite makes the interesting suggestion that " Anne Bradstreet wrote
more freely, and with less self-consciousness, in the sharp fresh air of Massachusetts than she would have done in the more conventional atmosphere of the
mother country."
Similarly revealing is the discussion of Anne's probable reaction to the publication of Michael Wigglesworth's Day ot Doom in 1662 (a necessarily conjectural opinion since there is no contemporary record of Anne's reaction).
Miss White very convincingly argues that Anne would not have liked Wigglesworth's best seller, not only for literary reasons, but for theological ones as well.
She points out that the extreme Calvinism preached by Wigglesworth was not
the motivating force for all Puritans: "The God whom [Anne] worshipped
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with devotion, trust, and a constant awareness of the blessings and mercies He
had vouchsafed to her ... was a far different Being than the vengeful and
relentless Judge of Wigglesworth's poem."
Miss vVhite's criticism is thus free of misconceptions about Puritan aesthetic
theory. She shows that whatever hostility Anne's contemporaries might have
felt to her writing poetry ,vas the result not of Puritan theology but of the
simple need for survival in a hostile pioneer environment that left little time for
the luxury of belles-lettres. Her being a woman, too, would have caused some
negative reaction, and it js Anne's role as a ,yornan which Miss White focuses
on as the most dynamic source of tension in her poetry. She avoids, however,
any special pleading for Anne because of her being a woman; rather she evaluates
the poetry itself on aesthetic grounds, with no overemphasis on either her
femininity or her Puritanism. In short, the balance is perfect. Anne comes across
as much an Elizabethan as a Puritan, as much a human being as a woman.
In spite of some weaknesses, then, Miss White's book deserves a careful
reading. It is a mine of valuable information about Anne Bradstreet and her
poetic career. Even though Anne as a distinct personality does not dominate the
book, as much of Anne as we do see is portrayed in a balanced and objective
manner, as a personality in tension between her nvo vocations-as wife and
mother on the one hand, and as poet on the other. The career of the tenth muse
comes through strongly enough to remind us that the Puritans were lovers of
good poetry and that a pioneer environment could indeed give birth to a poet
of power and grace.
CONSTANCE
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Libra de buen a'll1or by Juan Ruiz, Archpriest of Hita, ed. Raymond S. \iVillis
with introduction and English paraphrase. Princeton: Princeton University
Press,19i2. Pp. xcvi 479. $20 (cloth); $9.50 (paper).
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Raymond Willis' edition of the Libro de buen ammo aims at a variety of goals;
it brings a nc\\' text of Juan Ruiz' fourteenth-century masterpiece along with a
facing English paraphrase, and an introductory essay of some seventy pages. To
overcome some of the initial difficulties faced by his readers, Willis offers a
regularized Spanish. Forms like sossegat are changed to their modern equivalents
(sossegad), and the imperfect and conditional forms ending in -ie are normalized
to the modern -fa, an ending also recorded in the text. In addition, the reader
has the aid of a facing paraphrase which both offers an accurate translation of
the verse and allows for the inclusion of explanatory material. This translation,
unlike the prose translation of Rigo Mignani and J\!1ario Di Cesare (State University of New York Press, 1970) or the project nearing completion by Saraly
Daly and Anthony Zahareas (to be published by New York University Press
in the late spring) which extend their approaches to non-Spanish readers, is
designed for readers of modern Spanish \vho may require assistance with the
archaic forms and vocabulary of Old Spanish and who, one hopes, will eventually
bring new insights to discussion of the work. Willis' introductory essay focuses
on the critical as well as the philological issues prominent in Libro studies.

"
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The usefulness of Willis' scheme of text and facing paraphrase is evident in the
concluding copla of the Toledo MS. of the Lib1'O.
Era de mill e trezientos e sesenta e
fue acabado este libro, par muchos
que fazen muchos e muchas a otros
e por mostrar a los simples fablas e
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The paraphrase clarifies two points-the date and the use of "fablas "-\vhich
may escape the reader coming to the Libro for the first time: "In the year of
the Era of Caesar Augustus, one thousand, three hundred and sixty-eight lA. D.
1330], this book \vas finished, for many evils and wrongs that many men and
women do to others with their deceits, and to display to simple people exemplary
tales and ingenious verses." Like the Archpriest's, the aim here is didactic; and,
again like the poet, "Tillis plays multiple roles which seem to conflict \vith each
other. As an editor he wants to establish, in his phrase, the \vork's "pristine
text." At the same time he is a reader with important things to say about the
poem. Because of these roles, the introduction is by turns infuriating and insightful. At times it seems out of control, burying provocative critical statements
under basic information and editorial judgment.
The Lib1'O survives in two distinct versions. The first, dated 1330, is preserved
in the Gayoso and Toledo MSS. (designated G and T). A later manuscript from
Salamanca (MS. S), dated 1343, makes a number of additions to the text: a prose
prologue and ten stanzas which precede the original opening; several episodes
about further amorous adventures; and a group of final pieces (lyrics, a complaint to Fortune, and the Song of the Clerks of Talavera) which arc not related
to the narrative. Willis' editorial argument is that .MS. G represents the" pristine
version" (again his phrase) of the Libra. But is a pristine version a genuine
question? And for whom? The poet himself gives onc view in copla 1629:
Qualquier omne que l' oya, si bien trobar sopiere,
puede mas anedir e emendar 10 que quisiere;
unde, de mano en mana, a quienquier que 10 pedicre;
como pella las duenas, t6mclo quien podicre.
Willis' paraphrase: "Whoever hears it, if he knows how to compose poetry,
may add more to it and emend whatever he wishes to; let it pass from hand
to hand to anyone who may request it; as ladies catch a ball, let him catch it
\vho can." One value of a definitive text lies in the possibilities it presents for
understanding the author's concept of his \vork and for understanding the shape
he seeks to give his creation. Yet the poet's own statement makes clear that he
sees his book as public property, as part of an animated and popular culture
which may damage but never can distort his work.
This animation is apparent throughout the narrative, but nowhere more so
than in the adaptation of the Pampbilus de a'l7l0Te, a pseudo-Ovidian scholastic
comedy which Menendez y Pelayo once termed "a cold erotic abstraction."
In Juan Ruiz' tale the characters lose their classical names and become i\lel6n
(' melon' and' badger'), Endrina (' sloeberry '), and Trotaconventos (' convent
runner '). The narrator himself speaks as Don jVlelon de b. Huerta, the badger
in the garden who devours the sloeberry, and Endrina seems to identify him for

188

BOOK REVIEWS

the audience in speaking of "mi arnot de Fita" Esc. Hita}. He also seems the
inheritor of conversations between the two women to which he has not been
privy and about which the reader has been shown that his one source, Trotaconventos, is unreliable. Beyond the use of a first person narrator and the changes
in names (La Rama 'the branch' is a typically witty one for Endrina's mother),
Juan Ruiz inflates the dimensions of the lovers' passions by placing them in
the social context of what amounts to a bourgeois comedy of seduction, grief,
reproach, and eventual resolution. At this point he tells the audience that he is
not Don Mel6n and that the story is exemplary, not personal.
The conflict between arbiter and critic exists at yet another level. If we concede
the possibility of a definitive text in this book, then why is it regularized? The
variety of forms in MS. G is certainly as much a part of the text as the highly
structured narrative which Willis sees in the original version, and preserving
those forms would seem necessary to maintaining the integrity of the first version.
So the instructive aim of the book works at cross purposes with the editorial
goal. The contradiction here could have been resolved by expanding the sections
on morphology and language in the introduction to include a table of variant
forms while retaining those forms in the text. The reader would thus have a
faithful text in front of him as well as a paraphrase to guide him through
difficult passages.
Another conflict, between the editor and the critic, runs deeper and probably
cannot be resolved within the scope of this book. The statements that make the
introduction often provocative are critical positions. One, for example, goes
directly to the issue of a controlling pattern in such a diffuse narrative as the
Libra: "The structure of the poem may seem to be random and disjointed,
but not if we see the work as originally an organic poetic whole whose texture
is the quintessence of fluidity and mutability: every passage flows into the next,
poetically if not logically; everything can be transformed into something else,
just as the rhymed narrative constantly turns into song or parable." (p. xlvi)
The various identities of the authorial "I" and the metamorphosis of Love as
first abstraction, then personification, and later Don Amor are, as Willis maintains, illustrations of an essential process. But the phenomenological argument is
not contingent on this style of textual criticism, that is, on the establishment of
one MS as the authentic version of the Libro and the consequent judgment of
the later version as destructive. If fluidity and mutability characterize tlle original
work, then the fact that there are additions only testifies to a continuing process.
The roles Willis attempts to fulfill as guide, translator, editor, and critic ultimately involve a multi-volume work or, better, a series of independent studies.
What his book does give us at the moment is a badly needed text for an audience
of promising readers whose primary interest is not in philology.
ROBERT EDWARDS

State Uni-versity of New York at Buffalo

